Abstract-The introduction of fourth-generation wireless technologies has fueled the rapid development of cellular networks, significantly increasing the energy consumption and the expenditures of mobile network operators (MNOs). In addition, network underutilization during low-traffic periods (e.g., night zone) has motivated a new business model, namely, infrastructure sharing, which allows the MNOs to have their traffic served by other MNOs in the same geographic area, thus enabling them to switch off part of their network. In this paper, we propose a novel infrastructure-sharing algorithm for multioperator environments, which enables the deactivation of underutilized base stations during low-traffic periods. Motivated by the conflicting interests of the MNOs and the necessity for effective solutions, we introduce a game-theoretic framework that enables the MNOs to individually estimate the switching-off probabilities that reduce their expected financial cost. Our approach reaches dominant strategy equilibrium, which is the strategy that minimizes the cost of each player. Finally, we provide extensive analytical and experimental results to estimate the potential energy and cost savings that can be achieved in multioperator environments, incentivizing the MNOs to apply the proposed scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE rapid expansion of mobile services, along with the emerging demand for multimedia applications, driven by the widespread use of laptops, tablets, and smart devices, has led to an impressive growth of the data traffic volume during the last few years. According to recent market predictions [1] , global mobile data traffic is expected to increase nearly 11-fold in the next five years, reaching 15.9 EB per month by 2018. Hence, mobile network operators (MNOs 1 ) seek to extend their infrastructure by installing more base stations (BSs), in an effort to increase the capacity of their network and meet these pressing traffic demands.
The additional infrastructure not only implies a rise in the capital expenditures, but also has a direct impact on the network energy consumption, thus resulting in higher operational expenditures [2] . The use of information and communication technology across a wide range of applications accounts for 5.7% of the world's electricity consumption and 1.8% of global carbon emissions [3] , something that translates into electricity bills in the order of $10 billion for the MNOs worldwide [4] . Hence, there is a strong motivation to investigate solutions to bring down the energy consumption and the cost of networks, thus yielding both environmental and financial gains. Given that cellular networks are dimensioned according to peak-hour traffic demands, an effective approach towards this direction is to temporarily switch off part of the BS infrastructure that remains underutilized when the network traffic is low.
The coexistence of multiple MNOs in the same geographical area [5] , which is due to legal regulations that obligate them to install their antennas on the same buildings, has motivated a new business model known as infrastructure sharing [6] , [7] . This new paradigm embraces a set of strategies that enable the MNOs to use their resources jointly to reach their common goal, which is to guarantee user service while achieving energy and cost reduction. Infrastructure sharing is classified into three categories [8] : 1) passive sharing of sites, masts, and building premises; 2) active sharing of the active network components, such as antennas, switches, and backhaul equipment; and 3) roaming-based sharing, where the MNOs share the cell coverage for a prenegotiated time period.
In this paper, motivated by the aforementioned issues, we propose a roaming-based infrastructure-sharing scheme, which is applicable in multioperator environments during low-traffic periods. Taking into account the rationality of the MNOs and their conflicting interests, we introduce a game-theoretic framework that enables the MNOs to make individual switching-off decisions for their own BSs, thus bypassing potential complicated service level agreements among them. Apart from the expected energy efficiency benefits, the proposed scheme allows the MNOs to significantly reduce their financial costs independently of the strategies of the coexisting MNOs, providing them with the incentives to participate in the game. Our contribution is summarized as follows.
1) As a part of an integrated roaming-based infrastructure-
sharing scheme for multioperator environments, we introduce a game-theoretic switching-off algorithm that 0018-9545 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
aims at minimizing the individual MNO cost in a distributed manner. We define a realistic cost function that explicitly considers actual roaming and operational costs for the MNOs. We show that, in the proposed game, dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE) can be reached, which is defined as the strategy yielding the minimum cost for each MNO, regardless of the other MNOs' actions. 2) To address the heterogeneous nature of voice and data traffic in current and future cellular networks, we design an analytical model, which is based on a 2-D Markov chain, that theoretically estimates the throughput, the energy efficiency, and the cost expenses both for the individual MNOs and the whole network. 3) We validate the theoretical analysis and assess the effectiveness of the proposed infrastructure-sharing scheme with the aid of extensive simulation experiments. We introduce a new performance metric, namely, cost efficiency, which connects the network performance with the financial benefits of the MNOs. The results indicate the potential total energy efficiency gains in the network and highlight the individual cost and energy gains for the MNOs. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the related work. The system model, the network configuration, and the notation used throughout this paper are described in Section III. In Section IV, we introduce the infrastructure-sharing scheme, along with the game formulation of the switching-off decision. In Section V, we present the analytical models for the energy efficiency, the network throughput, and the cost metrics. The validation of the model and an extensive performance assessment are provided in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Since the BS is one of the most power-hungry network components, several research works have focused on reducing the number of BSs through optimal [9] , [10] or heterogeneous deployment strategies [11] , [12] . Recently, in an effort to achieve more drastic energy saving gains, the research community has shifted toward the investigation of BS switching-off schemes [13] - [17] . The core idea is to increase resource utilization during periods of low traffic (e.g., night) by switching off part of the BS infrastructure, while the remaining active BSs extend their coverage to serve the whole network area.
These traditional switching-off schemes can be taken one step further by considering the emerging business model of infrastructure sharing among multiple MNOs offering service to the same geographical area. In particular, significant research attention has been placed on roaming-based infrastructuresharing solutions that consider joint BS switching off among multiple MNOs [18] - [22] . In [18] , a noncooperative game for switching off BSs in a two-MNO network is presented. In their pioneer work, Marsan and Meo [19] proposed four cooperative strategies to switch off BSs in networks with two MNOs, according to the following criteria: 1) equal switching-off time periods, 2) equal roaming costs, 3) equal energy gains, and 4) maximum energy savings. In all these cases, the traffic of the switched-off BS is roamed to the collocated BS of the active MNO. In [20] , Marsan and Meo extended the algorithm that maximizes the energy savings (proposed in [19] ) for multioperator environments with various traffic types and quality of service (QoS) requirements (i.e., throughput and lost calls). In the same context, Oh et al. [21] studied the potential energy savings that can be achieved by opportunistically switching off part of the network during low traffic in real-world scenarios. In our former work [22] , we introduced a game-theoretic switching-off strategy in networks with two MNOs, providing analytical expressions for the throughput and energy efficiency calculation, assuming only one type of traffic (i.e., voice).
Nonetheless, despite their novel insights in the infrastructure sharing concept, the aforementioned works study only particular aspects of the problem (e.g., switching-off time, roaming cost, and energy savings). However, to provide feasible and efficient solutions, it is necessary to take into consideration all the important parameters (i.e., roaming and operational cost, energy consumption, and QoS in terms of lost calls). In addition, the consideration of only voice traffic in some works (e.g., [19] and [20] ) is not realistic, since data traffic forms a significant part of the total traffic load in current cellular networks. Last but not least, the assumption of only two MNOs in the network is a limiting factor for the contribution of the given works, as the most common scenarios in European countries involve three to four MNOs [5] . In the following sections, we propose a distributed BS switching-off solution that enables efficient infrastructure sharing in multioperator networks, taking into account realistic cost and traffic patterns.
III. SYSTEM MODEL

A. System Model and Operation
Our system model, which is shown in Fig. 1(a) , considers clusters of multioperator cells. Each cluster is formed by one central cell surrounded by M peripheral cells, whereas each cell includes N BSs of different MNOs. Therefore, the term BS n,m is used to denote the BS of the nth operator in the mth macro cell, with n ∈ [1, N] and m ∈ [0, M]. Part of the BS infrastructure in the M surrounding cells may be switched off during low-traffic conditions, motivating the MNOs to share the resources of the remaining active BSs in the same cell. In contrast, the central cell BSs always remain active and increase their transmission power to form an umbrella cell, in the extreme case where all the BSs of a peripheral cell are switched off.
Regarding the traffic model, we adopt a realistic pattern [23] , [24] for the aggregate voice and data traffic per operator in a given cell during the night zone. As shown in the leftmost part of Fig. 1(b) , the maximum traffic per hour is expressed as a percentage of the total BS capacity BW that is considered the same for all cells. We focus on the time zone between 01:00 A.M. and 09:00 A.M., 2 when the total traffic per BS is relatively low (i.e., less than 20% of the cell's capacity).
For the sake of generality, we assume that the traffic of different operators follows the same pattern but may vary in volume. Hence, we define the percentage of each MNO's traffic load ρ n ∈ [0, 1] with respect to the maximum traffic for the respective hour. In the example shown in the rightmost part of Fig. 1(b) , the traffic of three MNOs is considered. The first MNO has the maximum traffic volume (i.e., ρ 1 = 1), whereas the second and third MNOs have 70% and 30% (i.e., ρ 2 = 0.7 and ρ 3 = 0.3) of the maximum traffic, respectively. Finally, the voice and data connections are served at a constant bit rate (CBR) of R V and R D , respectively. 
B. Notation
Before proceeding to the algorithm description, let us define the following sets.
• M = {1, . . . , M}, with |M| = M , is the set of peripheral cells forming a cluster around a central cell.
• N = {1, . . . , N}, with |N | = N , is the set of N operators covering the cluster area.
• M ON ⊆ M, with |M ON | = M ON , is the subset of peripheral cells with at least one active BS. 3 We consider that no rate adaptation takes place within the cell and that all users of a given service class are allocated the same amount of resources, calculated for cell-edge users. Although this is the worst-case scenario, our approach is suitable for our high-level study, whereas the optimized resource allocation (i.e., spectral efficiency) is not so critical during the night zone.
• 
IV. INFRASTRUCTURE SHARING WITH GAME-THEORETIC SWITCHING-OFF DECISION
In this section, we introduce a framework for multi-operator environments, consisting of two parts: 1) an infrastructure sharing algorithm and 2) a game theoretic switching off decision strategy. The infrastructure sharing algorithm that defines the rules for the MNOs collaboration, given that part of the BS infrastructure is switched off during the night is presented in Section IV-A. Then, in Section IV-B, we formulate the BS switching off decision as a game theoretic strategy that enables each MNO to determine the best course of action in each cell, in order to reduce its own cost and energy consumption.
A. Infrastructure-Sharing Scheme
Let us recall that the considered system model (see Section III-A) includes N MNOs that provide coverage to a cluster of one central and M peripheral cells. For the low-traffic night zone, a subset of each operator's BSs in the peripheral cells is switched off. Once this BS subset is determined (through the game-theoretic algorithm described in the following section), the proposed infrastructure-sharing scheme is applied to determine how the traffic will be served by the remaining active infrastructure, taking into account the corresponding operation and roaming costs.
The proposed infrastructure-sharing scheme is applied in the network after the execution of the independent switching-off decisions. According to the outcome of the decision process, there are three possible outcomes in a peripheral cell m. OF F ). In particular, the traffic of each switched-off BS is roamed to an active BS of the same cell, which is randomly selected with equal probability p s from the subset N (m)
ON . The MNOs of the deactivated BSs should pay the corresponding roaming cost to the active operators. However, the increased energy consumption (due to higher traffic) of the active BSs implies a higher cost that should also be considered. operators take into account the extra cost for the increased power consumption in the central cell.
Having defined the general network operation, each MNO is able to make an individual switching-off decision without the need of exchanging information and, subsequently, to execute the infrastructure-sharing algorithm (see Algorithm 1 below), as shown in Fig. 2 . Given the aforementioned three possible outcomes for the peripheral cell m, four different cases can be observed from the point of view of the nth operator (i.e., M N O n ).
• Case 1-Operator n is ON, and N 
roam is the roaming cost paid by M N O i and can be considered as a portion of the total operational cost, i.e., C (n,m)
Consequently, in this case, the total cost for operator M N O n can be written as:
).
• Case 3-Operator n is OFF, and N 
B. Game-Theoretic Switching-Off Strategy
The proposed infrastructure-sharing scheme defines the rules of agreement among the MNOs, taking as an input the subset of switched-off BSs in the peripheral cells. Hence, the individual switching-off decisions constitute the core of the proposed scheme and its main contribution. By considering the conflicting interests and the interaction among the MNOs, as well as the different available courses of action, we propose a game-theoretic BS switching-off strategy. We model the switching-off decision process as a static noncooperative game with complete information [25] , played by the N MNOs in each of the M peripheral cells. Noncooperative game theory provides multifold advantages, enabling us with the following capabilities.
• We can model the aforementioned conflicting situations between the MNOs with high accuracy.
• We can minimize the exchange of information among the different MNOs. This is very important since, in TABLE I  COST MATRIX OF THE PROPOSED GAME competitive environments, the MNOs may not be willing to disclose extensive network information to their competitors. Furthermore, minimizing interactions can reduce the risk of misbehavior, since selfish operators could choose to modify their statistics to increase their personal benefits.
• We can reach distributed close-to-optimal solutions for realistic scenarios. In the proposed game, DSE can be achieved, which can be easily calculated with limited required information. The DSE represents the solution where each player's assigned strategy minimizes its cost, regardless of the other players' strategy, and in our formulation, it is very close to the Pareto-optimal solution.
The remainder of this section is divided into three parts. First, the game formulation and the cost matrix are given, followed by the individual cost minimization analysis in the second part. Finally, the DSE of the game is discussed, along with some numerical results on the switching-off probabilities.
1) Game Formulation: Definition 1:
The noncooperative game Γ can be represented in strategic form by the triplet: Γ=(N , S n,m , C n,m ), with n ∈ N , m ∈ M, where the variables are defined as follows.
• N = {1, . . . , N} is the finite set of players corresponding to the N operators. The cost function of the game C n,m has been selected to match the cost paid by each operator in every peripheral cell, as described in Section IV-A. However, exploiting the fact that the small traffic load variations during night have a negligible impact on the operational cost of the BS, it can be assumed that all operators have approximately the same cost for serving the traffic in a given cell m, i.e., C
tr . Similarly, the roaming cost, which is expressed as a function of the operational cost, is also simplified to C (n,m)
roam . This realistic simplification has two direct implications on the game formulation. First, the operators can accurately calculate their cost function by using average traffic statistics for a given cell. As a result, there is no need for information exchange among MNOs (to obtain the actual traffic values) prior to the application of the game, thus facilitating its implementation and eliminating any concerns about truthfulness. Second, by simplifying the cost functions, the MNOs obtain the same payoffs for a given action, and as a result, the outcome of the game is independent of the identity of the players. Hence, by definition, the proposed game is symmetric, allowing its formulation as an N -player game with two macro players: 1) Player A is a given M N O i , with i ∈ N , and 2) player B is the set N \ {i}, formed by the remaining N − 1 operators, excluding M N O i . The matrix representation of the game is given in Table I , showing the costs of player A with respect to the different contingencies of player B.
The costs in Table I correspond to the different cases of the infrastructure-sharing algorithm described in Section IV-A, after applying the aforementioned simplification. The formulation of our problem in a strategic form reveals one pure strategy, corresponding to the case where the MNOs switch off in all peripheral cells, thus minimizing the number of active BSs. However, this strategy would require major transmission power increase of the central BSs and could lead to lost sessions, since the central cells may not have sufficient capacity to support all the traffic of the cluster. This limitation of the pure strategy, along with the motivation of the MNOs to achieve energy efficiency without sacrificing ubiquitous service in the network, have motivated us to study the problem in the mixedstrategy domain, to provide feasible and applicable solutions for distributed systems. Therefore, we proceed to a mixed-strategy approach, where the MNOs randomize over the possible actions with a certain probability distribution. In the following section, we calculate the strategy that minimizes the cost of each player, and then, by exploiting the symmetry of the game, we prove that DSE is achieved.
2) Individual Cost Minimization Analysis: The aim of the game is to calculate the set of switching-off probabilities that minimizes the expected cost of
To that end, we define as s i,m the probability of player A (i.e., M N O i ) switching off BS i,m . Furthermore, due to the symmetry of the game, the remaining N − 1 operators are grouped together into player B, having a common switching-off probability s j,m . Subsequently, the expected costs of player A in each state of the game are estimated as follows. ON . The random decision does not affect the outcome of our approach, since the roaming cost is indifferent to the BS selection. Hence, the number of switched-off BSs that will select operator i to serve their traffic (N (i,m) roam ) will determine its actual cost. To calculate the cost, all the possible roaming combinations that involve the ith MNO must be considered, leading to (3), shown at the bottom of the page.
1) Case 1 (ON,ON): The expected cost for MNO i is
E C ON,ON i,m = (1−s i,m ) · (1−s j,m ) N −1 · C const +C (m) tr .(2)
3) Case 3 (OFF,ON):
In this case, the traffic of the switchedoff BS i,m is roamed to one active BS, with a cost
4) Case 4 (OFF,OFF):
The BSs of all operators are switched off, and the traffic is served by the corresponding BSs of the central cell, which increase their transmission power to cover the peripheral cell, with an expected cost
Substituting (2)- (5) to (1), we derive (6), shown at the bottom of the page.
The goal of each MNO is to estimate its individual switching off probability that minimizes its cost. To that end, the strategy that minimizes the cost of the ith MNO, i.e., s i,m , given the strategy s j,m , is calculated by the roots of the partial derivative of the cost function with respect to s i,m , shown in (7), at the bottom of the next page.
Having provided the analysis for the individual cost minimization strategy, in the following section, we exploit the symmetry of the game to prove that the estimated value for s j,m corresponds to the DSE.
3 (8) , shown at the bottom of the next page.
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix A. Proposition 2: The DSE of the game Γ is unique. The proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix B. Unlike other widely employed game-theoretic concepts (e.g., Nash equilibrium) that may require a number of iterations before converging to an acceptable solution [27] - [29] , DSE can be always achieved in one shot. This is very important in our case where multiple iterations cannot be implemented, given that the continuous interchangeable switching on and off of the macro BSs is not considered as a viable option by the mobile operators [26] , [30] . However, our practical and realistic game formulation enables the MNOs to reach the DSE by estimating one-shot switching-off probabilities, which is particularly important in our problem. Hence, instead of applying an iterative algorithm that follows the best-response dynamics to converge to an equilibrium, we show that one MNO can estimate the switching-off strategies by knowing only the total number of operators (N ) in the network.
Having derived the theoretical expression for the mixed strategies DSE, we study the impact of the number of MNOs and the roaming cost parameter α on the switching off probabilities through some numerical results, presented in Table II . The cost values are calculated based on the average traffic volume, given Fig. 1(b) . We consider values from N = 2 up to N = 6 operators, while we assume five different values for α with respect to the definition of roaming cost in Section IV-A.
Two main conclusions can be derived from Table II . First, the DSE switching off probabilities increase with the number of MNOs. Particular, the coexistence of many MNOs in one cell motivates a given MNO to switch off its BS, as it implies a higher probability of having its traffic roamed to a different MNO. Regarding the second observation the switching
TABLE II DSE SWITCHING-OFF PROBABILITIES off probability decreases for higher roaming cost, which is a prohibitive factor for the BS deactivation. However, it is worth noting that the DSE probability is severely reduced for higher roaming in networks with few MNOs, due to the risk of switching off all BSs in the cell. On the other hand, in a network with many MNOs, where the aforementioned risk is not so evident, the switching off probability for high a is still significant. Finally, in Appendix C, we compare the DSE to the global optimal solution to provide further insights for our game formulation.
V. ANALYTICAL MODEL
Here, we provide analytical models for the calculation of network throughput, energy efficiency, and cost.
As mentioned in Section III-A, the network traffic consists of voice and data, with CBRs R V and R D , respectively. We assume that for each BS n,m , voice calls and data sessions are Poisson generated processes with rates λ By analyzing the state transition diagram (see Fig. 3 ), we obtain the system of linear equations for steady-state probabilities, i.e., p (ν,d) . The balance equation that represents the valid transitions is given by (10) , shown at the bottom of the page, where ϕ ν,d and ϑ ν,d denote thecharacteristic functions, i.e.,
The steady-state probabilities are calculated given the condition that the sum of the state probabilities is equal to 1, i.e.,
Employing the steadystate probabilities, we calculate some key performance metrics for the individual BSs and the whole network.
A. Operator-Wide Performance Metrics
Here, we analyze the performance of a BS n,m with total bandwidth of BW , belonging to operator n in a given cell m. We focus on the night zone, with duration t night , when voice and data sessions have an average generation rate of λ (n,m) V and λ (n,m) D , respectively.
1) Definition 3-Cell Throughput:
The expected throughput E[T n,m ] for BS n,m is defined as the average number (over all possible states) of served sessions in the system multiplied by the transmission rate of each session (i.e., R V and R D for voice and data, respectively) and calculated as
where p (ν,d) are the steady-state probabilities for the given traffic load rates λ . A very important and relevant metric in our work is the normalized throughput, which is defined as the ratio of the served connections to the total existing connections in the network. This metric is often employed to represent the grade of service (GoS) in telecommunication systems, showing the level of user satisfaction in the system. Achieving a normalized throughput of 100% signifies that all users are served, which is a key requirement for MNOs.
2) Definition 4-Cell Energy Efficiency:
The expected energy efficiency E[η (n,m) ] for BS n,m is defined as the ratio of the average transmitted bits E[B n,m ] over the average energy consumption E[E n,m ], i.e.,
where E[B n,m ] can be calculated by multiplying the average throughput [see (13) ] with the duration of the night zone
To calculate the average energy consumption, we consider the power consumed by the BS for operation and transmission, consisting of three components: 1) the constant power P const , which is consumed by an active BS for operations such as cooling, antenna feeding, etc.; 2) the idle power P idle , which is the power consumed when the BS remains idle, i.e., when it has no ongoing traffic sessions 4 ; and 3) the transmission power for serving the ongoing traffic sessions corresponding to each state p (ν,d) , considering that P tx denotes the transmission power for serving a single voice or data session. Hence, the average energy consumption during the night zone t night is given by 4 The fraction of time that the BS remains idle is expressed by the probability p (0,0) in the Markov chain (see Fig. 3 ). inc refer to the costs related to the operation of an active BS and the service of the existing traffic. These costs directly depend on the energy consumed for the different functions of the BSs. Therefore, provided that c 1 is the electricity charge per energy unit, in [C/kWh], the operational costs of a BS can be expressed as a function of the average energy consumption [31] . Thus, we have
where P idle and P tx denote the power consumed when the BS remains idle and the transmission power for serving a single voice or data session, when the central BS increases its power. With regard to the roaming cost, C (n,m) roam corresponds to the amount paid when an operator roams its traffic to the BSs of another operator. In Section IV-A, the definition of the roaming cost with respect to C const and C (n,m) tr was given. Now, this definition is extended by considering the operational electricity charges. Based on the energy consumption of a BS, i.e., E[E n,m ], the roaming cost is given by
4) Cost Efficiency:
Having defined theoretical expressions for the network performance and cost, we introduce a novel metric, which is named cost efficiency, that connects the performance with the total cost for each operator.
Definition 5: Cell cost efficiency, which is measured in Mbits/C, is defined as the ratio of the average transmitted bits over the operator's total expenses. Accordingly, the cost efficiency of an operator n in a peripheral cell m is
B. Network-Wide Performance Metrics
In continuation, we calculate the respective metrics for the network of N operators in a cluster of one central and M peripheral cells. Based on the game-theoretic analysis (see Section IV-B), each operator n may choose to switch off the BS of a peripheral cell m with a switching-off probability s * . As previously explained, depending on the case, the traffic of each switched-off BS is served either by the central BS of the same operator or by a different operator of the same cell.
To calculate the global performance metrics of the network, we calculate the average traffic load that is served by each BS after the application of the infrastructure-sharing algorithm. We define as λ (n,m) T , T = {V, D} the new average traffic load of the BS n,m for voice and data traffic, which is equal to the traffic λ (n,m) T of the nth MNO plus any additional roamed traffic. We distinguish the following two cases.
• For each BS n,0 of the central cell
Using these values for the traffic load, the steady-state probabilities p (ν,d) for each BS are recalculated and employed for the estimation of the key network metrics, as explained below.
1) Definition 6-Total Network Throughput:
The total throughput of the cluster, i.e., E[T ], is the sum of the average throughputs of the active BSs in the M peripheral cells and the central cell (which always remains active)
where E[T n,m ] is the average throughput of an active BS n,m in cell m, which is calculated by (13) using the corresponding traffic load [see (22) ]. Similarly, E[T n,0 ] is the average throughput of the central BSs, with average traffic load given by (21) .
2) Definition 7-Total Network Energy Efficiency:
The total energy efficiency E[η ] in the cell cluster is calculated as the total number of transmitted bits E[B] divided by the total energy consumption E[E], i.e.,
. (24) Similarly to (23) , E[B] is calculated as
where E[B n,m ] and E[B n,0 ] are the average transmitted bits for the BSs of the peripheral and the central cells, respectively, calculated for the corresponding traffic [see (22) and (21)]. Accordingly, the total energy consumption is derived as
3) Definition 8-Total Network Cost:
The total cost of the network, i.e., E[C], is the sum of the average cost of all operators for the operation of their active BSs and for the service of the existing traffic load, which is estimated as (27) where E[E] is calculated by (26) for the average traffic served over a year. Apparently, the total network cost is not affected by the roaming cost, which only specifies the amount of money that is going to be exchanged among the operators.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We have developed a custom-made C++ simulator for the network operation to validate the analytical expressions and assess the performance of the proposed infrastructure-sharing scheme. Here, we present the simulation setup, along with the analytical and experimental results.
A. Simulation Scenario
The simulation scenario considers a seven-cell cluster with one central and M = 6 peripheral cells. Each cell is served by N BSs of different MNOs, as described in Section III-A, and up to N = 6 MNOs are considered in our experiments.
To assess the performance of our scheme, we compare the proposed game-theoretic infrastructure-sharing strategy (referred to as GTIS hereafter) with three state-of-the-art approaches [19] , [20] : 1) aRoaming-to-One scheme (R-to-1), where the MNO with the highest traffic serves the total traffic in the network, whereas the rest of the MNOs switch off their BSs during the entire night zone; 2) a Roaming-to-All approach, namely, Energy-balanced (E-bal), where the MNOs switch off their BSs for different portions of time to balance their energy saving; and 3) a Roaming-to-All approach, namely, Roamingbalanced (R-bal), where the MNOs switch off their BSs for 
B. Model Validation
Here, we validate via extensive simulations the analytical models of the network throughput, energy efficiency, and network cost for different traffic profiles, roaming cost values, and number of MNOs in each cell. In these experiments, we assume that all MNOs have the same traffic volume, i.e., ρ n = ρ. Fig. 4 (a) and (b) presents the total network throughput performance for different traffic profiles and number of MNOs, respectively. As we can see, the experimental results perfectly match the analysis, thus validating the proposed theoretical expressions. In both figures, we observe that the throughput presents similar behavior with the traffic load model (see Section III-A). As expected, the network throughput also increases with the traffic load of each operator (ρ), as well as with the number of MNOs in each cell (N ). It is worth mentioning that the roaming cost does not affect the throughput performance in the case of N = 4 MNOs, since there are no lost calls in the network. For a higher number of operators, there are missed calls, and this impact will be also studied in Section VI-D. Fig. 5 shows the total network energy efficiency achieved by the proposed infrastructure-sharing policy for different traffic profiles [see Fig. 5(a) ], number of operators [see Fig. 5(b) ], and roaming cost values [see Fig. 5(c)] , which affect the switching-off probabilities and, consequently, the total energy efficiency. First, the analytical expressions given in Section V are again validated, while we observe a very similar behavior with the throughput case. More specifically, we observe that the network energy efficiency increases as the network becomes more loaded (i.e., for heavier traffic loads or higher number of operators). Hence, the proposed algorithm provides an effective energy-efficient solution that encourages the operators to share their infrastructure to reduce the energy consumption. Furthermore, energy efficiency increases as the roaming cost drops, since lower roaming costs lead to increased switching- off probabilities, as seen in Table II , thus reducing the energy consumption of the network.
To gain more insight on the network performance, we have plotted the average network energy efficiency during the night zone versus different traffic volumes [see Fig. 6(a) ] and roaming cost values [see Fig. 6(b) ]. In Fig. 6(a) , we observe that although the absolute value of the network energy efficiency increases with the number of operators, the relative difference ratio is independent of the traffic load. More specifically, in all cases, a network of N = 6 operators is approximately 80% and 280% more energy efficient compared with networks of N = 4 and N = 2 operators, respectively. This interesting fact can be explained by taking into account that the outcome of the game-theoretic algorithm (i.e., switching-off probabilities) is not affected by the traffic load variations. Referring to Table III , we observe that the difference between the constant power and the transmission power is significant. Thus, small variations on the traffic do not affect the probability calculation. On the other hand, as shown in Section IV-B3, the switching-off probabilities strongly depend on the roaming cost, thus affecting the network energy efficiency [see Fig. 6(b) ]. As also shown in Fig. 5(c) , the energy efficiency is reduced as the roaming cost increases, whereas this impact is stronger for a smaller number (N ) of operators. However, the relative difference of the energy efficiency gain with respect to N increases for higher roaming costs. For instance, for low-traffic loads (α = 0.1), a network of N = 6 operators achieves 36% higher energy efficiency than a network of N = 4 operators, whereas this difference is considerably increased to 174% in case of α = 1.0. This occurs because, although the switching-off probabilities are low for high roaming costs, the presence of more operators leads to a higher probability of sharing the infrastructure. Fig. 7 shows the total network annual cost for different traffic profiles [see Fig. 7(a) ], number of operators [see Fig. 7(b) ], and roaming cost [see Fig. 7(c) ]. The analytical expressions given in Section V are again validated, whereas the results follow a very similar behavior with the throughput and energy efficiency only in the case of varying traffic profiles. On the other hand, the annual cost decreases with a higher number of MNOs and decreasing roaming cost values. Given the switching-off probabilities, as given in Table II , in networks with a high number of MNOs, the switching-off probability increases, leading to a smaller number of active BSs, which contribute to the total network cost according to (27) . On the other hand, with increasing roaming cost, the MNOs are unwilling to switch off their BSs, resulting in higher aggregate cost.
C. Roaming Cost Analysis
The analysis and the experiments have revealed the criticality of the roaming cost parameter in roaming-based infrastructuresharing schemes. Therefore, the selection of an appropriate range of α for the performance evaluation of our proposal becomes of paramount importance. To that end, Fig. 8 presents the total network energy efficiency achieved by the proposal compared with four schemes for the whole range of roaming cost values. We compare GTIS with the baseline scenario (i.e., No Switch Off) and three state-of-the-art approaches (i.e., R-to-1, E-bal, and R-bal), which do not depend on the roaming cost. As previously mentioned, by employing R-to-1, the MNO with heavier traffic load concentrates on the traffic of the whole network, giving the opportunity to the rest of the MNOs to switch off their BSs. In E-bal and R-bal, the MNOs switch off their BSs for different portions of time to achieve equal energy gains and roaming costs, respectively. As a result, the switchingoff time of each MNO depends on their traffic load but is independent of the specific value of the roaming cost. In Fig. 8 , we observe that GTIS outperforms R-bal independently of α, whereas there is an interesting tradeoff with regard to the R-to-1 and E-bal schemes. Our proposed solution achieves higher energy efficiency for low values of α (i.e., α < 0.5 comparing with R-to-1 and α < 0.78 comparing with E-bal). However, performance drops as the roaming cost increases, and for high α, R-to-1 and E-bal achieve higher energy efficiency compared with GTIS (i.e., α > 0.5 and α > 0.78, respectively). When employing GTIS, the MNOs do not have a strong incentive to switch off their BSs for high roaming values. Since energy efficiency is one of the key goals of the proposed scheme, we focus on the values of α that ensure enhanced energy efficiency performance with respect to the state-of-the-art schemes (i.e., α ∈ [0, 0.5]). Consequently, we have selected two indicative values of α within this range (i.e., α = 0.1 and α = 0.5) for the performance assessment of our proposed solution.
D. Performance Evaluation
This section includes the performance results with regard to various metrics, either telecommunication oriented (network throughput and energy efficiency) or cost oriented (annual cost and cost efficiency). To generalize the assessment of our proposal, we consider different traffic volumes for the network operators. In particular, we assume that M N O 1 has the maximum possible traffic load (i.e., ρ 1 = 1), whereas the rest of the MNOs have a common traffic volume ρ, which is a portion of the maximum load (i.e., ρ 2 
1) Telecommunication Metrics: Despite the importance of estimating the absolute values of throughput in the system, the deactivation of BSs potentially implies loss of connections.
To that end, we consider the normalized throughput, which is an important GoS indicator that represents the percentage of served connections in the system. Fig. 9 presents the normalized throughput of the three infrastructure-sharing schemes for different numbers of MNOs. In Fig. 9(a) (N = 4) , we can see that all schemes guarantee the user service for variable traffic load conditions (i.e., ρ < 0.8). However, as the traffic volume grows, the R-bal, E-bal, and R-to-1 approaches experience small losses (around 2%, 3%, and 5%, respectively), which still can be prohibitive for wireless cellular networks, whereas the proposed GTIS approach is able to guarantee the service of all the connections in the network. Hence, our scheme can guarantee the service of all connections for the case of N = 4 operators, which is highlighted as the most typical scenario in recent studies [5] . For a higher number of operators, our proposal still outperforms the other three solutions, and it guarantees the proper service in the network for traffic volume values up to ρ = 0.8 (case N = 5) and ρ = 0.7 (case N = 6).
The degraded performance of the R-to-1 scheme is explained by the high number of deactivated BSs and the traffic service by one MNO only, whereas our approach proposes a distributed traffic roaming among the coexisting MNOs. In addition, we observe that GTIS achieves different performance with respect to the varying values of roaming cost, thus justifying once again the importance of this variable. For relatively small values of α (i.e., α = 0.1), there are fewer active BSs, and as a result, the number of lost calls increases. However, compared with the state-of-the-art schemes, the GTIS supports higher traffic without losing any calls. For instance, in the case of N = 6 MNOs and α = 0.5, the GTIS provides full traffic service, whereas R-bal supports up to ρ = 0.6, E-bal up to ρ = 0.5, and R-to-1 only up to ρ = 0.2. Fig. 10 presents the total network energy efficiency versus ρ for two different values of α and N = 4 operators. We observe that all schemes have the same behavior, since the energy efficiency increases with the traffic load. An important remark is that, for low roaming cost (α = 0.1), GTIS significantly outperforms the baseline scenario (where no BS is switched off), as well as the three state-of-the art algorithms. However, for higher values of α, the energy efficiency gain of GTIS compared with the R-to-1 scheme gradually decreases, and eventually, the two schemes achieve similar performance for α = 0.5. Although the total network energy efficiency performance is the same, it is interesting to study the individual energy efficiency gains of the different MNOs. To that end, the individual gains for the specific (but representative) case of ρ = 0.1 and N = 4 are quantified in Table IV , where interesting conclusions can be extracted. In particular, independently of α, the R-to-1 scheme is beneficial only for the group of operators that switch off their BSs, whereas the operator with the active BSs faces important energy efficiency degradation. More specifically, the active operator is subject to higher energy consumption to serve the traffic of the whole network, whereas the rest of the operators theoretically achieve infinite energy efficiency, as they have their traffic served at zero energy cost. The proposed GTIS eliminates this unfairness, by guaranteeing energy efficiency gains to all operators, providing them with extra incentives to switch off their BSs by participating in the game. Comparing with E-bal and R-bal, which allow all MNOs to switch off their BSs for different time periods, the respective energy efficiency gains of the GTIS approach are clearly higher due to the lower number of active BSs. 
2) Cost Metrics:
The total network annual cost and the individual annual gains for the MNOs, having as a benchmark the No Switch Off scheme, are presented in Fig. 11(a) and (b), respectively. We observe that the total annual cost is not significantly affected by the traffic variations, since the fixed cost for the network operation is much higher than the cost due to the energy consumption in the network radio part. The corresponding values are also shown in Table III . In addition, for low roaming cost values (α = 0.1), GTIS achieves a considerable reduction (around 86%) of the annual network cost, which is mainly due to the deactivation of many underutilized BSs. Regarding the individual revenue of each operator, as plotted in Fig. 11(b) , we may observe that, similar to the energy efficiency gains, the R-to-1 scheme provides financial gains only to particular MNOs and, more particularly, for the MNOs that switch off their networks, whereas M N O 1 has higher expenses with respect to the No Switch Off scheme. On the other hand, for GTIS, all operators are able to have higher economic benefits compared with the E-bal and R-bal schemes, independently of the particular roaming cost value. Furthermore, as α increases, the GTIS achieves higher financial gains for the operators due to the increased roaming cost values.
Finally, Fig. 12 shows the cost efficiency of the operators, which is a metric that provides an indication for the relation between the served traffic and the financial cost. In Fig. 12(a) , we illustrate the individual cost efficiency with respect to different values of roaming cost. The traffic load in the network (ρ) has a great impact on the cost efficiency, which, on the other hand, is not significantly affected by the roaming cost (α) values. The cost efficiency increases with the lower roaming cost due to the reduced energy consumption. In addition, Fig. 12(b) presents the cost efficiency gains of the infrastructure-sharing schemes, where the No Switch Off scheme is a benchmark. The plot in Fig. 12 (b) verifies our results so far, as it highlights the great difference in the R-to-1 approach between the active operator and the rest of the operators in the system. The proposal of switching off the whole network of the MNO with lower traffic (R-to-1) results in great cost efficiency for M N O 2 − M N O 4 , which do not consume any energy and are encumbered only with the compensation of the roaming cost to the active operator. On the contrary, M N O 1 serves the whole traffic of the network and consumes significant energy, leading to an increased cost that is not compensated by the received roaming. GTIS overcomes this issue by providing cost efficiency gains to all operators, outperforming, at the same time, the E-bal and R-bal schemes.
E. Discussion
Based on the analysis in Section VI-D, we have shown that the proposed GTIS outperforms the state-of-the-art approaches in terms of throughput, energy efficiency, and annual network cost. In addition, it achieves balanced energy efficiency, cost gains, and cost efficiency results for all the MNOs. Furthermore, through an extensive assessment, we have identified the significance of the roaming cost parameter, i.e., α. In particular, higher values of α achieve higher throughput. On the other hand, better performance results are attained in terms of energy efficiency, aggregate network cost, individual cost gains, and cost efficiency, when lower values of α are chosen. Hence, the MNOs should choose the suitable value of α depending on their priorities. For example, if energy efficiency is not a priority, each MNO could achieve better individual throughput performance by setting higher α. On the other hand, lower α leads to great energy efficiency gains for the network, whereas the individual performance of each operator is enhanced in terms of energy and cost gains.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, motivated by the low BS utilization during the night and the coexistence of multiple operators in the same area, we have proposed a novel infrastructure-sharing algorithm that encourages MNOs to share their resources and switch off redundant BSs. By employing game-theoretic tools and realistic cost functions, we introduced a switching-off scheme that allows the MNOs to reduce their expenditures in multioperator cellular environments. The proposed scheme has been evaluated in terms of throughput, energy, and cost efficiency for various traffic conditions and roaming cost values. The results have shown that our proposal can significantly improve the network energy efficiency, guaranteeing at the same time the network throughput in realistic scenarios of up to four MNOs. Regarding the financial costs/gains, the proposed scheme provides higher cost efficiency and fairness compared with the state-of-the-art algorithms, motivating the operators to adopt game-theoretic strategies for their decisions. In our future work, we plan to elaborate on cooperative game-theoretic schemes to investigate the potential tradeoffs. probabilities, i.e., s i,m = s j,m . By substituting these values in (7), we can obtain the strategy s * , thus deriving (8) . The roots of (8) correspond to the strategy of all players that minimizes the individual cost of each player. According to [26, 
Hence, we derive a common strategy profile for all operators, i.e., s * i = s * . Each element s * is the dominant strategy for a given player, as it minimizes their expected cost, irrespectively of the strategies of the other players. Consequently, the solution, which is calculated in (8) , is proven to be a DSE in our game.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Given the symmetry of the game and by using the equality s i,m = s j,m = s * , we will show that, under specific conditions and reasonable assumptions, the proposed game has a unique mixed-strategy DSE. Each operator has, as an upper goal, to estimate its individual switching-off probability that minimizes its cost. To that end, we calculate the roots of the partial derivative of the expected cost function with respect to s * . Thus, we get (29) , shown at the bottom of the previous page.
According to the Heine-Borel theorem [32] , if the cost function is concave (i.e., if its second derivative is always positive 
APPENDIX C COMPARISON OF THE DOMINANT STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM WITH THE GLOBAL OPTIMIZATION SOLUTION
Here, we compare our noncooperative approach to a centralized solution. In Fig. 13 , we show the DSE for different numbers of MNOs, along with the global optimal solution (Pareto optimal), that represents the solution with the minimum expected cost. The DSE switching-off probabilities result in low cost values that are very close to the optimal values. In addition, it is worth noticing that the difference between DSE and Pareto-optimal points varies with the number of MNOs. In particular, the presence of more MNOs leads to higher differences, thus requiring the precise calculation of the DSE to avoid higher costs. However, in most typical scenarios in European countries where no more than N = 4 operators are involved [5] , our proposed formulation estimates accurate close-to-optimal switching-off probabilities.
